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UNCLE SAM'S RIGHT TO DAMAGES
FOR DELAY IN THE WONDERLAND
OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING
James A. Lande*
INTRODUCTION
If Humpty Dumpty happened to wander into the wonderland
of Government contracting, he might feel quite at home in the topsy-
turvy terrain. In this strange land he would probably be told that
the Government is like any ordinary individual when making a con-
tract, yet he could readily observe a vast difference between Gov-
ernment and commercial contracts.' Furthermore, contractors
appear to recover much money in claims against the Government,
but one hears of little activity by the Government to recover its
claims against contractors. In the eyes of the law, under contract
principles, both parties are equal. However, while contractors obtain
substantial sums for delay caused by the Government, the Govern-
ment does not seem to recoup its losses due to tardy performance
by the contractor. Does "delay" mean one thing when the contractor
uses the word in pressing a claim against the Government, but take
on quite a different meaning when the parties are reversed?
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-
that's all."?
A sensitive ear so rarely hears of the Government collecting
damages against a contractor for late delivery or delayed contract
performance that one might wonder whether the Government even
has the right to collect at all. Or is it that those who are responsible
* B.A., Swarthmore College, 1952; J.D., Columbia University School of Law,
1955; Lecturer in Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law; Attorney, Office of
Chief Counsel, Ames Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration;
Member of the California and New York Bars.
This article is published under the auspices of the NASA-Ames/University Aero-
space Institutes. The opinions and conclusions expressed are solely those of the author,
and do not represent the views of NASA or any other agency of the federal govern-
ment.
1 See vom Baur, Differences Between Commercial Contracts and Government
Contracts, 53 A.B.A.J. 247 (1967) ; accord, Cuneo, Stabilization under Government
Contracts, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1968).
2 L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LoOKNG GLASS 106 (Peter Pauper ed. 1967).
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for Government policy 3 would rather the Government refrain from
exercising rights it might really have? Perhaps the true question
concerning the Government's entitlement to "delay damages" is not
what those words may mean in the law, but, as Humpty Dumpty
perceived, who is the master in using them.
The purpose of this article is to explore what the Government
might and should do to recover damages for delay caused by a con-
tractor despite Government acceptance of such delayed perfor-
mance. Part I explores the Government's common law right to such
damages. Part II sets forth various procedural remedies available
to the Government should it seek redress for delayed contractor
performance. Part III identifies recoverable damages. Finally, Part
IV raises considerations of public policy.
PART I
THE GOVERNMENT'S COMMON LAW RIGHT TO DAMAGES FOR DELAY
One of the marvels in the land of Government contracting is
the fact that many times the Government cannot, for practical
reasons, exercise one of its most potent contract rights, i.e., the
unilateral right to terminate a contract for default in performance.
As the Government's posture is weakened by continued contractor
delay in performance, the Government often becomes fearful that
it will suffer still further if it terminates the contract. There is no
doubt that the Government could terminate for failure of the con-
tractor either to deliver on time, or to make sufficient progress in the
prosecution of the work so as to endanger performance of the con-
tract.4 Yet often, when the Government is buying products or ser-
vices not readily reprocurable from another source, or when it is
trying to meet a tight timetable, it really does not dare to terminate
the contract. The added loss of time in reprocurement from another
3 In our tradition Government policy is made by the elected representatives
of the people, i.e., the Chief Executive and members of Congress. With respect to
military procurement, however, some see a remarkable reversal of the American
political and economic system. We find the Armed Services or the corporations that
supply them making the decisions and instructing the Congress and the public, states
John Kenneth Galbraith, well-known political economist. "The public accepts whatever
is so decided and pays the bill. This is an age when the young are being instructed
. . . to respect constitutional process and seek change within the framework of the
established political order. And we find the assumed guardians of that order . . .
calmly turning it upside down themselves." Galbraith, How to Control the Military,
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, June, 1969, at 38.
4 This contractual right is provided in the standard form default clause of Govern-
ment contracts. See, e.g., ASPR 7-103.11; FPR 1-7.101-11; NASA PR 7.103-11, 8.707
-supply contracts. ASPR 8-709; FPR 1-8.709-1--construction contracts. NASA PR
7.302-9, 8.710-fixed-price research and development contracts.
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source would simply compound the already unacceptable delay.
Naturally the defaulting contractor is quite well aware of the Gov-
ernment's predicament; he knows that often it is in the best interests
of the Government not to terminate the contract for default.
In such circumstances the Government reluctantly but usually
accepts the contractor's delayed performance, despite the sometimes
heavy damages it incurs as a consequence. In the wonderland of
Government contracting it appears that such damages are rarely
recouped. Does this mean, one might innocently inquire, that the
Government lacks the legal right to recover delay damages?
A. The Rule at Common Law
At common law a vendor who promises to deliver goods on a
specified date and fails to do so breaches a condition of his contract.
If he delivers at a later date, and the vendee elects to accept de-
livery, of course the vendee is bound to pay for the goods or other-
wise proceed with his own further performance, since he has waived
his right to treat the breach of the condition of prompt performance
as a discharge of the contract. However, as pointed out by Professor
Corbin, the election to accept late delivery does not discharge the
vendee's right to damages for the vendor's breach. When sued for
payment, or for damages for his own failure of performance, the
vendee has a basis for recoupment or counterclaim.' The rule is well
stated by Williston:
At common law, it is the general rule that a vendee may accept the
goods and bring an action for damages he may have actually suffered
in consequence of late delivery; he does not, by accepting late deliv-
ery, waive any claim he may have for damages arising from the delay.6
Most courts are in accord. Although some decisions view ac-
ceptance of performance after the time fixed therefor as constituting
a waiver of damages (in the absence of an express reservation to
the contrary), the vast majority hold that such acceptance standing
7alone, and without more, does not constitute an effective waiver.
5 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 766 (1960).
6 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 704, at 379 (3d ed. 1961). Accord, § 856, at 231;
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 411, comment a (1932).
7 Robberson Steel Co. v. Harrell, 177 F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir. 1949). Citing
decisions from a number of jurisdictions, the court summarized the law on this point:
Some courts hold that unless there is an express reservation of the right to
sue, acceptance of performance after the time fixed is to be treated as a
waiver of damages. But the prevailing rule of wide acceptation with which
we find ourselves in accord is that while acceptance of performance after
breach may operate as a waiver of the right to treat the contract as terminated
by the breach, such acceptance standing alone and without more does not
constitute an effective waiver of the right of action for damages caused by
the breach.
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The rationale for the majority view is that the party not in default
is often forced through necessity to take what he can get under his
contract when he can get it. Therefore he has no intention of waiv-
ing his right to damages when he accepts performance after breach.'
Of course it is possible for a buyer to accept delayed perfor-
mance as full satisfaction of the seller's obligation, "but some
evidence other than mere acceptance of the goods is necessary to
warrant this conclusion." 9 Indeed, a clearly manifested intention to
waive the right to accrued damages and consideration therefor are
required before a court will find an effective waiver at common law.1"
B. Common.Law Applied to Government Contracts
It is well established that the law applicable to Government
contracts is federal law," which embodies principles of common
law. 2 Although there is a paucity of authority that passes directly
upon the issue of whether the Government can recover common law
damages for delayed contractor performance accepted by the Gov-
ernment, those decisions in point clearly hold that the Government
has the legal right to do so. This area of the law has been explored
in depth by the Comptroller General of the United States, whose
determinations are binding upon the Executive Branch.' His deci-
sions are particularly pertinent because they deal explicitly with
issues involved under the terms of a Government contract.
In 16 CoMP. GEN. 277 (1936), the contractor had failed to de-
liver needed supplies by the date specified. The Government could
have terminated the contract and reprocured the supplies elsewhere,
charging the contractor for the excess costs occasioned thereby. It
chose, however, to accept delayed delivery and as a result incurred
added costs. The Comptroller General was called upon to decide
whether these costs could be recovered from the contractor. He held
that the Government was not required to exercise its option to
8 Frankfurt-Barnett Co. v. William Prym Co., 237 F. 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1916).
9 5 WnLISTOr, CONTRACTS, § 704, at 380 (3d ed. 1961).
10 Robberson Steel Co. v. Harrell, 177 F.2d 12, 16 (10th Cir. 1949).
In Smith v. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co., 89 Okla. 156, 214 P. 178 (1923),
the court stated that a waiver, to be operative, must be supported by an agreement
founded upon valuable consideration. A contract of release of alleged damages was
found to be supported by consideration where an extension of time of payment under
a promissory note was given. See also Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 972, 973
(D. Md. 1941) (Government found not to have waived its right to damages).
11 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); United
States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1957).
12 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Rumley v. United
States, 285 F.2d 773 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D.
Md. 1941).
13 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964).
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terminate, but could, in the alternative, permit the contractor to
complete delivery after the contract completion date, and charge
the contractor with actual damages incurred by the Government
incident to the delay.
This determination did not rest upon any specific clause in the
contract relating to delay damages, for the contract did not provide
for the assessment of either liquidated or actual damages. Instead
the Comptroller General drew upon and applied principles of the
common law. Citing decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
the Court of Claims, as well as prior Comptroller General decisions,
he stated:
It has been held that where, as in this case, no specific provision
is made in the contract for either liquidated or actual damages upon
failure of the contractor to complete performance within the specified
time, the contractor is liable for resultant damages under the common
law in the event of delays in performance, and properly is chargeable
with all the expenses incurred by the Government on account of the
contractor's delays in performance. 14
The Comptroller General found the contractor to be at fault in fail-
ing to deliver the supplies on time. Accordingly the contractor was
held chargeable for expenditures by the Government for salaries and
subsistence of its employees while engaged in inspecting the supplies
after the date fixed by the contract for its completion.' 5
The opinion set forth in 35 CoMP. GEN. 288 (1955) represents
an extension of the applicability to Government contracts of com-
mon law principles concerning delay damages. The Comptroller
General not only applied the foregoing doctrine, but further probed
issues relating to damages and waiver. The contractor had failed to
supply the United States Treasury with certain embossed plates
within the time fixed by the contract. The Government did not exer-
cise its right to terminate the contract for default, but instead, at
extra cost, embossed and punched sufficient plates to meet its
immediate needs. Subsequently the Government accepted delinquent
14 16 Comp. GEN. 277, 279 (1936) (emphasis added).
'5 Id. Accord, 8 ComP GEN. 455, 457 (1929). "It appearing from the facts in this
case that the delayed performance is attributable solely to the contractor's own fault,
and as, under the decisions cited, contractors upon breaching their contracts with the
Government are chargeable with all actual damages caused thereby, the contractor
must be held responsible for all added expenditures occasioned the Government by the
failure to complete the contract work according to the agreement. Accordingly, the
amounts paid by the Government for meals for its employees and for salaries and
other expenses of its employees while engaged in inspecting and superintending the
contract work after the date fixed by the contract for its completion, were properly
charged to the contractor."
[Vol. 10
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deliveries from the contractor, but the disbursing officer deducted
from payment otherwise due the contractor the extra costs incurred
by the Government. The contract contained no provision for the as-
sessment of liquidated damages, and no provision for excess costs
except in the event of termination for default.
As in 16 CoMP. GEN. 227, the Comptroller General again held
that the option to terminate for default was not the exclusive rem-
edy available to the Government for delay in contractor perfor-
mance. He made specific reference in this instance to the language
of the contract's "default" clause which contained an express
declaration that the remedies therein specified were not exclusive,
but were in addition to any other remedies provided by law. Such a
provision is currently incorporated in Government contracts.1
In submitting a reclaim voucher the contractor contended that
the deduction constituted an arbitrary charge representing a "liqui-
dated damage" penalty not contained in the contract.'" However,
the Comptroller General treated the Government's extra costs as
damages which could properly be collected on account of the con-
tractor's delay in performance, and therefore denied the claim. His
determination was based upon the following common law doctrine:
It is well established that a party who is injured by another's
breach of contract is entitled to recover from the latter such damages
as are the direct, natural, and proximate result of the breach, or which,
in the ordinary course of events, would likely result from the breach
and which reasonably could be said to have been foreseen, contem-
plated, or expected by the parties at the time they executed the con-
tract as a natural result thereof.18
The Comptroller General found that when the agreement was
executed it could be readily foreseen that the Government would suf-
fer actual damages if the prescribed delivery schedules were not met.
16 The usual form of supply contract is S.F. 32 (June, 1964 ed.) which contains
the following provision in para. (f) of the Default clause: "The rights and remedies
of the Government provided in this clause shall not be exclusive and are in addition to
any other rights and remedies provided by law or under this contract."
17 Contractual provisions for assessing liquidated damages or actual damages due
to delayed contractor performance may be found in Government contracts, and maypresent issues related to (but not identical with) those under discussion. Concerning
liquidated damages, see Maryland Gas 'Co. v. United States, 93 Ct. Cl. 247 (1941);
Frank Wolfe Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 1709, 6 Contr. Cas. Fed. § 61858 (1955) ; American
Surety Co. v. United States, 136 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1943). See also, Cuneo, Waiver
of the Due Date in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. REV. 1, 24-28 (1957).
For cases involving Government contracts which expressly provide for Government
recovery of damages due to contractor delay, see Nalle v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 43(1916); New Jersey Foundry & Machine 'Co. v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 570 (1909).
18 35 CoMp. GEN. 228, 229 (1955).
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The amount deducted from payment otherwise due the contractor
was found to be a cost which the Government necessarily incurred
as a direct and immediate consequence of the contractor's failure
to deliver on time. Therefore "the deduction of that sum from
amounts otherwise due the contractor was correct and proper, not-
withstanding the fact that delayed performance by the contractor
subsequently was accepted."' 9
In view of the earlier discussion concerning waiver,2 ° it is rather
significant to observe the Comptroller General's application of the
following rule to a Government contract:
It is well settled that acceptance of delayed performance under a
contract is not inconsistent with the right to demand damages for de-
lay, and hence is not in and of itself a waiver.
21
In citing authorities for this principle the Comptroller General drew
upon federal and state decisions, the Uniform Sales Act, and Wil-
liston on Contracts. Furthermore, he expressly disapproved his
earlier contrary statement to the effect that acceptance of delayed
performance constitutes waiver.22
Today 35 CoMP. GEN. 228 (1955) is in full force and effect,
and decisions by the Comptroller General since 1955 have con-
sistently followed and applied its rationale.23 In addition, the same
approach to Government contracts has been adopted by the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, 24 the Department of Trans-
portation Contract Appeals Board,25 the Interior Board of Contract
Appeals, 26 the U.S. Court of Claims,27 and federal district courts28
and circuit courts of appeals.20 Accordingly the conclusion is in-
escapable that the Government has the right to recover common law
damages caused by a contractor's delay in performance accepted by
the Government.
19 Id. at 230.
20 See text accompanying notes 6 through 8, supra.
21 35 COMP. GEN. 228, 230 (1955).
22 The decision overruled on this point is 29 ComP. GEN. 57 (1949).
23 See the following Comptroller General decisions: B-131875, May 27, 1957;
B-154170, June 12, 1964; and B-164070, June 7, 1968.
24 See S. B. Penick & Co., ASBCA No. 749 (1951) ; Parkside Clothes, Inc., ASBCA
No. 4148, 60-2 BCA ff 2760 at 14,140 (1960).
25 See GMC Truck & Coach Division Gen. Mtrs. Corp., DOT CAB No. 67-16,
68-2 BCA 1 7114 (1968).
26 See McGraw-Edison Co., IBCA No. 699-2-68, 68-2 BCA g 7335 (1968).
27 See Camden Iron Works v. United States, 50 Ct. Cl. 191 (1915), overruling 15
CoMP. DEc. 282 on other grounds, but sustaining same on the point involved.
28 See Kolker v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 972, 973 (D. Md. 1941).
29 See American Surety Co. v. United States, 136 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1943).
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PART II
EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES ARE AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
TO RECOVER DELAY DAMAGES
A. Set-Off
To recoup its losses caused by contractor delay, the Govern-
ment can utilize various procedures, including set-off. Immediate
recovery can be obtained when the Government exercises its right
of set-off. The Government has the power to withhold from any
payment due the contractor the amount of its outstanding claims for
delay damages. This remedy is no different from the right at com-
mon law that every creditor has to deduct amounts due him from
amounts due his debtor. If the debtor happens to have two contracts
with the Government, one of which he has breached, "[i] t would be
folly to require the Government to pay under the one contract what
it must eventually recover for a breach of the other."3 This is a
common law right that exists apart from statutory authority, and it
is well established that the right applies to the Government as well
as to any other creditor. 1
In addition to the Government's common law right of set-off,
the Comptroller General has been vested with statutory set-off
authority: he is required to set off any indebtedness owed to the
United States by a person who seeks payment of a judgment ob-
tained against the United States. 2 Although the statute speaks ofindebtedness, it has been interpreted to authorize the Comptroller
General to set off claims of the Government against the judgment
30 Barry v. United States, 229 U.S. 47, 53 (1913).
31 16 ComP. GEN. 962, 963-64 (1937) ; 7 ComP. GEN. 576, 580 (1928).As succinctly stated by the Supreme Court: "The government has the same right
'which belongs to every creditor, to apply the unappropriated moneys of his debtor,in his hands, in extinguishment of the debts due him.'" United States v. Munsey
Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 239 (1947).
32 31 U.S.C. § 227 (1964) provides in part:
When any final judgment recovered against the United States dulyallowed by legal authority shall be presented to the Comptroller General of theUnited States for payment, and the plaintiff therein shall be indebted to theUnited States in any manner, whether as principal or surety, it shall bethe duty of the Comptroller General of the United States to withholdpayment of an amount of such judgment equal to the debts thus due tothe United States; and if such plaintiff assents to such set-off, and dischargeshis judgment or an amount thereof equal to said debt, the ComptrollerGeneral of the United States shall execute a discharge of the debt due fromthe plaintiff to the United States. But if such plaintiff denies his indebtednessto the United States, or refuses to consent to the set-off, then the ComptrollerGeneral of the United States shall withhold payment of such further amountof such judgment as in his opinion will be sufficient to cover all legal charges
and costs in prosecuting the debt of the United States to final judgment.
1969]
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creditor." It would thus seem clear that the Comptroller General
could withhold the amount claimed by the Government as damages
occasioned by a contractor's delay in performance if the contractor
sought to enforce payment of a judgment against the United States.
Furthermore Congress has clothed the Comptroller General, as
head of the General Accounting Office, with plenary powers to settle
claims by or against the Government. This authority is derived
primarily from his statutory responsibility as the supervisor of pub-
lic accounts and expenditures. 4 Undoubtedly the Comptroller Gen-
eral's "settlement powers" include the right to offset opposing claims
and to strike a balance between the debts and credits of the Govern-
ment with respect to a contractor whose delay in performance has
resulted in added costs to the Government. 5
Although binding upon the Executive Branch, the Comptroller
General's determination with respect to contract claims and counter-
claims is always subject to review by the Court of Claims. 386
88 See United States v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 359 U.S. 314, 324 (1959), wherein
Chief Justice Warren cited 31 U.S.C. § 227 as authority for the following statement:
The Government is authorized to withhold payment of Isthmian's judgment
in this case [a judgment against the United States] to the extent the Govern-
ment has claims outstanding against Isthmian. (emphasis supplied.)
Accord, Eastport Steamship Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 333 (Ct. Cl. 1955).
The Court held that under 31 U.S.C. § 227 the Comptroller General could set off the
amount of a claim of the United States as long as he instituted suit immediately to
obtain a judicial determination of the validity of the claim.
One commentator has explained that:
The set-off statute [31 U.S.C. § 227] . . . authorizes the Comptroller General
of the United States to withhold from a judgment creditor any amounts which
the Government asserts are owed it by the creditor. Should a creditor object
to a withholding, the statute directs the Comptroller to cause suit to be com-
menced promptly in order that the disputed government claim be reduced to
judgment. If the government loses such a lawsuit, it must pay the creditor in-
terest on the withheld sum, as well as the sum itself. 'Comment, Setoffs Against
the Government's Judgment Creditors as Compulsory Counterclaim, 68 YALE
L. J. 797-99 (1958) (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
84 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1964) prescribes that: "All claims and demands whatever by the
Government of the United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which
the Government of the United States is concerned, either as debtor or creditor, shall be
settled and adjusted in the General Accounting Office."
In addition, Congress has provided in 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1964) that: "Balances cer-
tified by the General Accounting Office, upon the settlement of public accounts, shall be
final and conclusive upon the Executive Branch . .. ."
85 28 ComP. GEN. 543, 545, 546 (1949) ; accord, United States v. American Surety
Co. of New York, 158 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1946).
86 In United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1947), the
Supreme Court stated:
[F]ederal statute gives jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear and
determine "All set-offs, counterclaims, claims for damages, whether liquidated
or unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever on the part of the Government
of the United States against any claimant against the government in said
court . . ." Judicial Code § 145, 28 U.S.C. § 250(2). This power given
[Vol. 10
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In short the right of set-off affords the Government swift re-
dress, without the initial delays and expense of litigation, to recoup
its losses caused by contractor delay.
B. Settlement
Considering the set-off power of the Comptroller General, the
contractor may be receptive to negotiating a realistic settlement
with the Government. Although the Comptroller General's Office
could make a settlement with the contractor, it will decline to do so
if the contractor disputes the facts on which the Government's claim
rests. For the General Accounting Office has no prescribed pro-
cedure for resolution of factual disputes; 7 the Comptroller General
has always recognized that "where the facts are in dispute or are
otherwise so uncertain as to require the taking of testimony, exam-
ination and cross-examination of witnesses, and the weighing of
conflicting evidence it is impracticable for the accounting officers
to determine with accuracy the true merits of such claims .... ""
Accordingly his Office refuses to undertake settlement where there
are substantial factual disputes or uncertainties. 9
However, the contractor can negotiate a compromise settlement
with the contracting officer, who is the executive officer of the Gov-
ernment charged with administering the contract. Under the Federal
Claims Collection Act of 1966,4" the head of an agency or his
designee could compromise a Government claim for delay damages
against a contractor, and cause collection action on any such claim
to be terminated; provided, however, that the claim does not exceed
$20,000. It may be noted that in the absence of compromise the
Joint Regulations issued under this act by the Comptroller General
and Attorney General call for aggressive agency collection action,
including collection by offset, which "will be undertaken adminis-
tratively on claims which are liquidated or certain in amount in every
instance in which this is feasible. . . . Appropriate use should be
made of the cooperative efforts of other agencies in effecting collec-
to the Court of Claims to strike a balance between the debts and credits of
the government, by logical implication gives power to the Comptroller General
to do the same, subject to review by that court.
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 250(2), as quoted by the Court, are the
predecessor of statutory language to the same effect presently set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1503, 2508 (1964).
37 21 ComP. GEN. 244 (1941).
38 44 ComP. GEN. 353, 358 (1964).
39 Comp. Gen. B-147326, May 25, 1962; Comp. Gen. B-149795, Jan. 4, 1963.
40 P.L. 89-508 (80 Stat. 308). This has been codified, and presently appears at
31 U.S.C. §§ 951-53 (Supp. II, 1967).
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tions by offset, including utilization of the Army Holdup List, and
all agencies are enjoined to cooperate in this endeavor."4
Beyond the express statutory authority of the Federal Claims
Collection Act there is some question as to whether a contracting
agency of the Government has "inherent authority" outside the
terms of the contract to settle claims for breach of the contract's
provisions. The Comptroller General has stated that contracting
agencies do not have inherent authority to settle breach of contract
claims.' However, the Court of Claims reaches a contrary conclu-
sion. ' The Supreme Court has recognized but failed to rule directly
upon this issue.44
If the Government does not manage to settle or compromise the
claim, and the contractor institutes suit against the United States,
then he can negotiate the matter with the Attorney General, who is
vested with authority to settle claims in litigation. 5
C. Board of Contract Appeals
If the contracting officer withholds funds to cover the Govern-
ment's claim for delay damages, can the contractor seek administra-
tive instead of judicial redress by appealing the contracting officer's
decision to the appropriate Board of Contract Appeals? Although in
the past the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has asserted
jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of such a Government claim,
41 4 C.F.R. § 102.3 (1969). See also General Accounting Office Policy and Pro-
cedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, Title 4, Sec. 61, "Procedures for
Withholding Amounts Due Indebted Contractors."
42 44 Comp. GEN. 353, 356 (1964). "[W]e do not subscribe to the view that a
contracting agency has 'inherent authority' outside the contract to settle claims ...."
43 Cannon Constr. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 173, 179 (Ct. Cl. 1963). "Sig-
nificantly, plaintiffs have cited us no cases where this court has invalidated, on the
ground of lack of authority, any agreement made by the contracting officer in the
settlement of a claim for damages for breach of contract. On the contrary, we have
held on numerous occasions that compromise settlements were valid and binding on
both parties."
44 United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 n.11 (1966). In
that case the Government asserted that its earlier views to the effect that executive
agencies lacked authority to settle breach of contract claims had now been abandoned.
The Court simply noted the Government argument without ruling on it.
One highly respected commentator in this field has pointed out the great and
unfortunate confusion that has arisen between the authority of accounting officers of
the Government, and the authority of the entire Executive Branch of the Government,
to settle claims for breach of Government contracts. Shedd, Administrative Authority
to Settle Claims for Breach of Government Contracts, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 481
(1959).
Since breach of Government contract claims are numerous and often substantial
in amount, it may be appropriate for Congress to settle the question of who has
authority on behalf of the Government to settle such claims.
45 38 Ops. ATv. GEN. 98 (1934); Halbach v. Markham, 106 F. Supp. 475 (D.N.J.
1952), aff'd 207 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1953). See SCHWARTZ & JACoBy, GOVERNMENT LIT-
1GATION 39-52 (1963).
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even in the absence of a contractual provision for delay damages,46
this view has been questioned in recent decisions of other Boards.47
However, even if the Board asserted jurisdiction and found for the
contractor, the legality of that determination would be subject to
review by the Comptroller General."
The recent case of GMC Truck & Coach Division General
Motors Corporation49 is directly in point. The contractor had agreed
to deliver trucks on a certain date, but breached the contract by
failing to do so. The Government accepted delayed delivery, and the
contracting officer decided to withhold from the price otherwise pay-
able the amount of extra project costs incurred by the Government
as a result of delayed delivery. The contract contained no provision
for the assessment of damages. The contractor appealed the con-
tracting officer's decision to the Department of Transportation Con-
tract Appeals Board. However, the Board held that it was withoutjurisdiction to adjudicate the matter on its merits. It reasoned that
since the Government's delay damage claim was based upon breach
of contract, it did not arise "under the contract" as that term of art
has been applied to confer jurisdiction under the Disputes clause of
the contract.
Nevertheless, the Board recognized the withholding as war-
ranted by the Government's common law right of set-off. It held that
it was proper for the contracting officer to withhold a reasonable
amount to cover what ultimately might be agreed or determined by
competent judicial authority to have been the amount of the un-
liquidated breach of contract damages due the Government. In short,
"the appellant breached the contract by delivering the trucks late.
A withholding is therefore warranted .. .as set-off to abide appel-
lant's ultimate liability.""ss
46 Parkside Clothes, Inc., ASBCA No. 4148, 60-2 BCA f 2760 at 14,140 (1960);
Houston-Fearless Corp., ASBCA No. 9160, 1964 BCA f 4159 (1964); Urban Con-
struction Corp., ASBCA No. 10059, 65-1 BCA f 4866 (1965).
"It is interesting to note," one commentator states, "that there is a little-known
line of Board cases holding that the Board has jurisdiction to review for correctness
unilateral determinations by the contracting officer of damages due the Government
for contractor breach." Lane, Administrative Resolution of Government Breaches-
The Case For An All-Breach Clause, 28 FED. BAR. J. 199,227 n.107 (1968).
47 GMC Truck & Coach Division General Motors Corp., DOT CAB No. 67-16,
68-2 BCA 1[ 7114 (1968); McGraw-Edison Co., IBCA No. 699-2-68, 68-2 BCA f 7335
(1968).
48 42 Comp. GEN€. 357 (1963); 43 CoMP. GsE. 231 (1963); 44 ComP. GEN. 1
(1964); 46 CoMP. GEN. 441, 451-63 (1966).
The Court of Claims agrees that the Comptroller General has the right to review
decisions of the Appeals Boards with respect to issues of law. Langenfelder & Son,
Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 600, 608 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
49 DOT CAB No. 67-16, 68-2 BCA f1 7114 (1968).
5 Id. at 32,959.
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Another recent case in point, McGraw-Edison Company,
51
applied the same logic to a Government counterclaim for common
law damages approaching one million dollars. The contractor had
sold transformers to the Bonneville Power Administration but failed
to deliver them on the date specified by contract. In fact, there was
a twenty-two month delay in delivery; nevertheless the Government
accepted the transformers. The.contracting officer found that the
contractor's delay was not excusable, and that the amount of con-
sequential damages suffered by the Government exceeded $900,000.
As a result the $449,098 balance of the purchase price claimed due
by the contractor was withheld from payment, and the certifying
officer requested the Comptroller General to advise whether a
voucher in any amount could be properly certified for payment
until such time as the amount recoverable from the contractor was
finally determined.
The Comptroller General noted the certifying officer's concern
that the Government's claim was not liquidated in the sense of being
for an amount certain, agreed to by the contractor or supported
by final administrative decision or legal judgment.52 Nevertheless
the Comptroller General instructed the certifying officer to continue
to withhold from the balance due under the contract such amount
as might be necessary to cover the Government's reasonable esti-
mate of damages resulting from the delay. "In this connection,"
noted the Comptroller General, "we believe the Government's actual
loss which would result from delay in delivery of the transformers
is the kind of damage which was reasonably foreseeable and should
be considered to have been contemplated by the parties."53
The Comptroller General took into account the fact that the
contractor was appealing the contracting officer's decision which
held the delay not excusable, and which established the basis for
withholding funds otherwise due the contractor. Nonetheless, the
Comptroller General concluded that there was "no compelling rea-
son in the record for the taking of administrative action not in
consonance with the contracting officer's decision until such time
as that decision is actually overruled or modified by the Depart-
ment of Interior Board of Contract Appeals or a court of competent
jurisdiction."54 Accordingly the withholding was continued and no
further payment made of amounts otherwise due the contractor.
When the contractor appealed the contracting officer's decision
51 IBCA No. 699-2-68, 68-2 BCA f 7335 (1968).
52 Comp. Gen. B-164070 at 3 (June 7, 1968).
53 Id.
54 Id.
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to the Department of Interior Board of Contract Appeals, Govern-
ment counsel argued that the Government's claim for damages at-
tributable to delayed deliveries was beyond the reach of the Board's
jurisdiction. The Board reviewed prior decisions in this area, giving
recognition to the ratio decidendi of the GMC case.55 However, this
appeal differed from GMC in that this contractor was pressing
claims against the Government, as well as asserting that its delay in
delivery was excusable. In this context the Government's claim for
damages resulting from the delay could be characterized as a coun-
terclaim. Undoubtedly the Board had jurisdiction to determine the
issue of excusable delay, and if it determined that the contractor's
delay was excusable, then of course the Government's claim based
upon such delay could fail. As stated by the Board, "a determina-
tion favorable to the appellant on the excusable delay claim could
directy affect the Government's claim for common law damages. In
short, there are questions of fact common to the several claims."56
Accordingly, the Board concluded that the question of its jurisdic-
tion over the Government's claim for common law damages could
best be determined on the basis of a complete administrative rec-
ord. Therefore it held the ultimate issue of jurisdiction in abeyance
pending a hearing. The Board pointed out that if following the hearing
"we conclude that we are without jurisdiction in the matter, the
complete record will be available for use in any subsequent court
proceedings which may ensue. '5
7
In addition to its value in any subsequent judicial proceedings,
the Board's record could also prove invaluable to the Comptroller
General in settlement of the Government's claim. Whereas pre-
viously he may have declined to make settlement because of a sub-
stantial unresolved factual dispute, the Comptroller General might
reconsider settlement on the basis of the Board's written record
setting forth all the facts.
Finally, if the contractor decides to bring suit in the Court of
Claims (either on a theory of breach of contract by the Govern-
ment, or as an appeal from an adverse decision by the Board of
Contract Appeals), the Government can counterclaim and obtain
judgment against the contractor for the amount of common law
damages the Government incurred under the very contract sued
55 "The GMC Case is also notable for the fact that despite the presence of
specific contractual provisions establishing delivery obligations on the part of the con-
tractor and payment obligations on the part of the Government, the Transportation
Board found that it had no authority under the contract to decide the dispute on the
merits." McGraw-Edison Co., IBCA No. 699-2-68, 68-2 BCA g 7335 at 34,114 (1968)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
56 Id. at 34,115.
57 Id. at 34,116.
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upon, and/or under another contract between the parties. 8 Of
course, where necessary, the Government itself can institute suit
against the contractor.
One may conclude that if the Government adopts an affirmative
policy to recoup its losses caused by contractor delay in delivery,
rather effective procedures are at hand to assure collection of the
damages due.
PART III
WHAT DAMAGES CAN THE GOVERNMENT RECOVER?
A. Requisites for Recovery
Just as a private party, the United States is entitled to recover
damages established according to common law principles. 9 Several
requisites may be briefly summarized:
First. The damage to the Government must be the direct, nat-
ural and proximate (rather than remote) result of the contractor's
delay in performance.60
Second. At the time the contract was executed it could reason-
ably be foreseen that if scheduled performance were delayed the
Government would suffer the kind of damages it did actually suffer. 6
Third. The measure of damages is the difference between the
contract price and the reasonable cost of the Government's ob-
taining performance after the contractor's breach.62 Thus the Gov-
ernment is entitled to recover excess costs incurred as the result of
the contractor's delay in performance. 3
Fourth. The amount of damages must be proven with reason-
58 Rumley v. United States, 285 F.2d 773 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
59 See discussion above, Part I B, and text accompanying note 14, supra.
60 See text accompanying note 18, supra; 11 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1344 (3d
ed. 1968).
61 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1006 et seq. (1964). Accord, RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS, Foreseeability of Harm as a Requisite for Recovery § 330 (1964) which reads:
In awarding damages, compensation is given only for those injuries that
the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his breach when
the contract was made. If the injury is one that follows the breach in the
usual course of events, there is sufficient reason for the defendant to foresee
it; otherwise, it must be shown specifically that the defendant had reason to
know the facts and to foresee the injury.
02 Rumley v. United States, 285 F.2d 773, 777 (Ct. Cl. 1961); United States v.
Behan, 110 U.S. 338, 345, 346 (1884).
63 35 CoMP. GEN. 228 (1955); 16 COMp. GEN. 277 (1936); 8 COMp. GEN. 455
(1929) ; Nalle v. United States, 51 Ct. CL. 43 (1916); Comp. Gen. B-131875 (May
27, 1957); Comp. Gen. B-154170 (June 12, 1964); Comp. Gen. B-164070 (June 7,
1968).
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able certainty. However, "there are various modifications of the
rule of certainty. They enable the courts, while holding up a high
standard of certainty as an ideal, to avoid harsh applications of it.
Among them are: (a) If the fact of damage is proved with cer-
tainty, the extent or amount may be left to reasonable inference.
(b) Where the defendant's wrong has caused the difficulty of proof
of damage, he cannot complain of the resultant uncertainty. (c)
Mere difficulty in ascertaining the amount of damage is not fatal.
(d) Mathematical precision in fixing the exact amount is not re-
quired. (e) If the best evidence of the damage of which the situa-
tion admits is furnished, this is sufficient."64
B. Items Includable
Examples of the kinds of damages recoverable include the
following:
1. Direct costs, such as:
a. Extra cost of obtaining item(s) contracted for from an-
other source during period of delay in performance.65
b. Additional inspection costs during delay period. 6
c. Added cost of Government supervision.6"
d. Extra transportation expenses. 68
e. Rental of substitute facilities69 or equipment. 70
f. Generally, additional expense for labor and materials in
64 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 27 (1935).
65 30 Comp. GEN. 191 (1950) (as a result of the contractor's delay in performance
it became necessary for the Government to purchase electric energy) ; 35 ComP. GEN.
228 (1955) (see discussion pp. 6-8 supra).
66 16 ComP. GEN. 277 (1936) ; 8 ComP. GEN. 455, 457 (1929) ; Samuel B. Harper,
Jr., ASBCA No. 4959, 59-1 BCA f[ 2186 (1959); J. W. Bateson, Inc., ASBCA No.
5300, 59-2 BCA f[ 2281 (1959); Urban Constr. Corp., ASBCA No. 10059, 65-1 BCA
IT 4866 (1965) ; Modern Indus. Bank v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 808 (1944). But see
Nalle v. United States, 51 Ct. Cl. 43 (1916) (inspection expense must be in excess of
that which would have been incurred had the contract been performed within the con-
tract period).
67 See cases cited note 66, supra.
68 J. W. Bateson, Inc., ASBCA No. 5300, 59-2 BCA IT 2281 at 10,223 (1959).
69 John M. Whelan & Sons v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 601, 613 (1942) (rental of
substitute Army officers' quarters) ; Schmoll v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 753, 756(Ct. Cl. 1946). (The proper measure of damages for delay in construction of building
is the reasonable rental value of the building on which construction was delayed, but
in the case of a building that has no rental value on the market, such as a post
office, rental for temporary quarters may be considered in determining damages.);
18 ComP. GEN. 483 (1938) (Where the contractor failed to deliver furniture on time,
and it became necessary for the Government to maintain an office in its old quarters as
well as rent the new quarters for which the furniture was being procured, the Gov-
ernment's additional rental expenses were properly chargeable to the contractor.)
70 Comp. Gen. B-154170, June 12, 1964 (rental of computer). See also Comp.
Gen. B-157557, January 7, 1966 (rental of computer).
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providing "expedients and improvisations" during the
delay period.7
2. Indirect costs, such as:
a. Overhead expenses."
b. Administrative expenses.
73
3. Under certain circumstances:
a. Loss of profits."
b. Interest.5
C. Recovering "Impact Damages"
However, the real "impact damages" cannot be so simply pin-
pointed. For instance, consider the mounting multiple injury the
Government suffers when one Government contractor's delay pre-
vents another's timely performance, and this delays a third con-
tractor, who in turn delays a fourth, etc. The chain reaction effect
that an individual contractor's delay can have upon a Government
project involving many contracts and substantial sums may be im-
mense. Truly this "total impact" could not be foreseen by the con-
tractor who did not know the scope and special circumstances of the
project. In fairness he cannot be held liable for any ensuing damages
beyond those reasonably and generally foreseeable.
On the other hand, if he knew of the special circumstances of
the Government project at the time the contract was let, the con-
tractor might be legally responsible for the damages that arise due
to the presence of those special circumstances and as a result of his
71 30 ComP. GEw. 191, 193 (1950) ("expedients and improvisations" to make max-
imum use of existing facilities) ; John M. Whelan & Sons v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl.
601 (1942) (extra labor to protect work during period of delay).
72 Modern Indus. Bank v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 808, 816-18, 822 (1944).
73 Id.
74 Comp. Gen. B-164070, June 7, 1968 (where a contractor delayed in delivering
transformers, the measure of damages applicable was the Bonneville Power Administra-
tion's loss of profits from the sale of power which would have been generated but for
the absence of the transformers).
75 In Schwartzbaugh Mfg. Co. v. United States, 289 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir.
1961), the court held that the government was entitled to recover interest on a
claim against the contractor commencing on the date of demand for payment by the
contracting officer, notwithstanding the fact that the contractor was entitled to follow
the disputes procedure. The court stated that the fact that neither the contract nor
any statute then provided for interest to be charged on a determined overpayment by
the government to plaintiff does not detract from the government's right to collect
interest on money overpaid to and withheld from it by the contractor. The court ob-
served: "That interest may be recovered on money due the government even in uni-
laterally determined liability is well recognized."
In addition, "Where, by reason of the defendant's delay in performing his contract,
the plaintiff's property has been compelled to remain idle, interest on the value of the
property may afford a proper measure of damages." 25 C.J.S. Damages § 77 at 866
(1966).
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delayed performance. In essence this is Hadley v. Baxendale ap-
plied to the space age:"
Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually
made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus
known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such
a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the
amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of con-
tract under these special circumstances so known and communicated.
Full discussion of the extent and limit of this doctrine as ap-
plied to today's sophisticated aerospace Government projects and
vast military procurements is beyond the scope of this article. How-
ever, it may be observed that this is a relatively undeveloped area
of the law, and undoubtedly the courts will establish limits beyond
which the contractor will not be charged with consequential damages
grossly disproportionate to the contract price. A particular contract
may be of such comparatively minor character as to give rise to
the inquiry whether the contractor, for his delay in performance
or breach causing delay, must suffer damages of a magnitude cor-
responding to the value of the completion of the entire project.
Nevertheless, the Government might lay the groundwork for
collecting full delay damages by simply informing the contractor
before he enters into his contract of the special circumstances sur-
rounding the contract and the project of which it is a part. Thus
the contractor would be told the scope and nature of the total proj-
ect, the role his contract plays in it, and what the consequences
would probably be with respect to related contracts and the project
itself if he fails to perform on time, or otherwise breaches his con-
tract.
76 The famous English case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 345 (1854) has been
quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court, in Primrose v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1894) as follows:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach
of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either
arising naturally-i.e. according to the usual course of things-from such
breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under
which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs
to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from
the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate,
would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach
of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated.
But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown
to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount which would arise generally, and
in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances,
from such a breach of contract." (Emphasis supplied to show the context of
the quotation in the text.)
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This information could be spelled out either in the invitation
for bids or in the request for proposals issued by the Government.
As a result all potential contractors would be equally advised and
would be in a position to bid or negotiate accordingly. At the same
time the criteria established by Hadley v. Baxendale for assess-
ment of damages due to special circumstances might be met. Thus,
by the simple medium of appropriate and timely communication,
the Government could improve its chances to collect the special
damages it suffers from delayed performance by an individual
contractor.
D. Strict Liability
Another newly emerging approach for Government recovery
of damages caused by a supplier rests upon the expanding doctrine
of products liability." Even where not directly related to damages
arising from delayed contract performance, this rapidly evolving
area of the law should be considered in assessing the Government's
rights and remedies for faulty contractor or subcontractor perfor-
mance. Today a growing number of jurisdictions impose strict
liability upon a manufacturer whose product causes personal in-
jury or property damage to the ultimate consumer.78 Under this
theory liability does not depend upon due care, nor does it have
the attributes of a warranty.79 The strict liability of a manufacturer
and his retailer are established when the plaintiff proves the follow-
ing: that he was injured, while using the product in a way it was
intended to be used, as a result of a defect in the product, of which
plaintiff was not aware, and which made the product unsafe for its
77 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (3d ed. 1964).
78 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MNN.
L. REv. 791 (1966). One of the more recent decisions among this growing trend is
Ulmer v. Ford Mtr. Co., 75 Wash. 2d -, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
79 Faced with the various legal obstacles of implied warranty and contract law,
Ulmer v. Ford Mtr. Co., 75 Wash. 2d -, 452 P.2d 729, 733 (1969), adopted the
approach of strict liability in tort, free from the contractual implications of war-
ranty. In doing so the court recognized that "warranty implied in law" is a legal fiction
to rationalize the now well recognized obligation of producers of goods. The court
quoted Dean Prosser as follows: "[A~ll the trouble lay with the one word 'warranty,'
which had been from the outset only a rather transparent device to accomplish the
desired result of strict liability. No one disputed that the 'warranty' was a matter
of strict liability. No one denied that where there was no privity, liability to the con-
sumer could not sound in contract and must be a matter of tort. Why not, then, talk
of the strict liability in tort, a thing familiar enough in the law of animals, abnormally
dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, libel, misrepresentation, and
respondeat superior, and discard the word 'warranty' with all its contractual implica-
tions?" Accordingly the court discarded the fiction of warranty and adopted the doc-
trine of strict liability, as expressed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 402(A)
(1965). See note 82, infra.
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intended use.80 This doctrine of strict liability has been applied by
courts to physical harm to property as well as physical harm to the
person," and has been adopted by the SECOND RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS.82 If the user or consumer whose property suffers physical
harm happens to be the United States Government, likely it could
recover under this doctrine against the subcontractor who manufac-
tured the defective item and the prime contractor who sold it to the
Government.83
Thus under several legal theories the Government might re-
cover from the contractor, upon proper proof, many items of
damages.
PART IV
CONSIDERATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY
Clearly the Government has the common law right, perhaps
well unpublicized, to recover damages for a contractor's delay in
performance. Potent procedures are available to enforce this right,
and the damages recoverable can be considerable. Furthermore, "[i] t
is unquestionably true that an official of the Government is not
authorized to give away or remit a claim due the Government.
80 Seely v. White Mtr. Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Vandermark v. Ford Mtr. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) ;
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963). See Gherna v. Ford Mtr. Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966);
Annot., 13 A.L.R. 3d 1057 (1967).
81 Seely v. White Mtr. Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965);
Gherna v. Ford Mtr. Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); Suvada
v. White Mtr. Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Dealers Transport Co. v.
Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges,
189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965) states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product For Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
83 J. Henry Glazer, Esq., Chief Counsel, Ames Research Center, National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, has successfully applied this doctrine in negotiating
settlements favorable to the United States.
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This rule is grounded in a sound public policy and is not to be
weakened." 4
Yet it seems the Government seldom vigorously presses claims
for delay damages. In the wonderland of Government contracting,
if the Government's common law right to damages is largely ig-
nored (through ignorance or otherwise), what should be done as a
matter of public policy?
A. Arguments Against a Policy of Recovery
Many would argue that as a matter of public policy Uncle
Sam should not be permitted to recover delay damages. In research
and development contracts, for instance, delivery dates perforce are
often nothing more than educated guesses which may later prove
unrealistic. The parties recognize this when entering into the con-
tract, and do not intend the delivery date to be rigidly enforced.
To do so would stifle the flow of research and development, it may
be said, to the serious detriment of the public interest. Other types
of Government contracts, it can be argued, also contain delivery
dates which are not realistic, for various reasons, and therefore
should not be strictly enforced.
Some would contend that delay damages are more appropriately
provided for by a liquidated damages clause, as set forth by the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations for use in fixed price
supply contracts and fixed price construction contracts. 85 How-
ever, damages for delay are not normally feasible in other types
of Government contracts, such as cost reimbursement and price
redeterminable contracts, since the contractor will incur additional
costs to avoid paying damages and these would be passed on to
the Government.
It might be argued that the Government has an unfair ad-
vantage in pressing its claims for delay damages because of the
various procedures available to it for doing so, particularly set-off.
84 Pacific Hardware Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 327, 335 (1914).
85 ASPR 18-113 requires in the case of fixed price construction contracts a liq-
uidated damages clause in contracts in excess of $25,000. With regard to fixed price
supply contracts ASPR 1-310 provides for the inclusion of liquidated damages provi-
sions in those cases where both (1) time of delivery or performance is such an im-
portant factor in the award of the contract that the Government may reasonably
expect to suffer damages if the delivery or performance is delinquent, and (2) the
extent or amount of such damages would be difficult or impossible of ascertainment
or proof.
It can be argued that the use of liquidated damages provisions should be expanded
in fixed price contracts because usually time is of the essence and the full extent or
amount of damages suffered by the Government due to contractor delay is often
difficult to prove.
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Most commercial buyers are not in a position to exercise their com-
mon law right of set-off, and some fear Government misuse of its
rights of set-off.
Others might say that it would be unconscionable for the Gov-
ernment to saddle a contractor with the risk of large consequential
damages, especially with respect to research and development con-
tracts and contracts of relatively small dollar value. Instead the
Government would better serve the public interest by assuming the
risk of delay and acting as a self-insurer.
As a practical matter, some would contend, the Government
might economically "cut off its nose to spite its face." In pressing
claims for delay damages the Government might become faced with
embittered contractors who refuse to do business with the Govern-
ment.86 Other contractors might demand greatly increased prices to
cover the contingency of loss in delay damages, and as a result the
Government might be forced to pay far more for a needed item than
its true worth."7 Indeed, if recovery of delay damages were vigor-
ously pursued, the Government could put out of business the very
firms upon whom it relies to supply its needs.
An analogous situation is presented under Government contract
warranty clauses88 and provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code89
for consequential damages which "proximately" result from a breach
86 See Hearings on S. 3097 Before the Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 28-34 (1968) (Company refused to accept an order for equipment
for a new submarine, despite priority rating under the Defense Production Act. Be-
cause of contractor recalcitrance, the Navy was forced to accept reduced rights in
contract).
87 Where the Government includes a liquidated damage provision in the contract,
there is reason to believe that bidders raise their price significantly to cover the con-
tingency of loss:
"Occasionally government procurement agencies have insisted that liquidated
damages clauses be inserted in contracts, especially for fixed-price construction con-
tracts. Such clauses provide a specific dollar penalty for each day by which deliveries
fall behind scheduled dates. An unusual example of their application to advanced
weapons work occurred in connection with the Minuteman ICBM program, when
the Army Corps of Engineers Missile Construction Office proposed to penalize Minute-
man base contractors $2,000 for each day of completion date slippage on each launcher
control facility. But perhaps partly because of the liquidated damages requirement,
the lowest firm fixed-price bid received was 55% higher than government estimates
of what the work should have cost. As a result, new bids were solicited on the basis
of cost reimbursement and fixed-price incentive relationships, and apparently the
liquidated damages provisions were eliminated" (emphasis added). F. SCHERER, THE
WEAPONS AcQuisirsoN PRocEss: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 308 (1964) [hereinafter referred
to as SCHERER].
88 ASPR 1-324.10; NASA PR 1.324-10 (warranty clause for fixed-price construc-
tion contracts).
89 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715. Although the Code provision is cast in
terms of "injury ...proximately resulting from any breach of warranty .. . ." the
term "proximately" is not defined.
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of warranty. The question, of course, is how far will this kind of
liability be extended? Put realistically, "[i] s an electronic manufac-
turer liable for the full cost of an aircraft if his equipment (for
example, navigation equipment) fails and causes the aircraft to
crash?" 9 Many would probably agree with the Air Force view that
the contractor's responsibility for damages should be reasonably
limited:
We have always been of the firm view that the soundness of our
Air Force depends ... on the soundness of our aerospace industry.
There has never been and does not now exist any desire on the part of
the Air Force to cause severe financial loss to a Government contractor
as a result of the enforcement of a warranty. We believe in meaningful
warranties by our contractors but also that they must be reasonable.
By reasonable we do not mean holding the contractor responsible for
secondary or tertiary damage as a result of defective performance by
the contractor. 91
Finally, it might be argued that there are alternative methods
of assuring timely performance which are more palatable and thus
more efficacious. In negotiated contracts, for instance, incentive and
award fee provisions" can effectively motivate the contractor to
meet scheduled delivery dates by depriving him of potential profit
if he fails to do so; or, as seen from "the other side of the coin,"
incentive formulas reward him with greater profit for avoiding
delay.
B. Why Public Policy Requires Government Recovery
of Delay Damages
Whether the foregoing arguments are persuasive may depend
upon one's point of view concerning the role and function of Gov-
ernment contracts. However, in the broader perspective, public
policy should be seen as serving the interests of the taxpayer. For
him the arguments above may amount to nothing more than a
rationalization of a prevalent permissiveness in administering Gov-
ernment contracts.
It is evident that the Government has been lax, at the tax-
payer's expense, in enforcing some significant rights. For instance,
90 Dick & Smith, Warranties and Their Use in DOD Contracting: A Brief Guide
to Some Legal & Practical Aspects, 10 AF JAG L. REV. 4, 15 (1968) [hereinafter
referred to as Dick & Smith].
91 Remarks made by General Thomas P. Gerrity, Commander, AFLC, to the Day-
ton Chapter of the National Security Industrial Ass'n (January 25, 1968), as quoted in
Dick & Smith, supra, at 15 n.97.
92 See generally, R. Nash, Incentive Contracting (Government Contracts Mono-
graph No. 7, 1963); SCHERER, supra. See NASA Cost Plus Award Fee Contracting
Guide, NHB 5104.4 (1967) ; NASA Incentive Contracting Guide, NHB 5104.3 (1967).
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one of its few rights "with teeth" is the Government's right to
terminate a contract for default. "In practice, however, government
procurement agencies resort to termination for default only on
relatively small contracts and when contractor performance has
been flagrantly unsatisfactory."93 When termination is called for,
most contracts are terminated for the convenience of the Govern-
ment, thus assuring a contractor of profits he would lose if the
contract were terminated for default. A House of Representatives
committee concluded that: "Apparently the default clauses of the
armed services procurement regulations are a 'dead letter' as far
as large aircraft contracts of the Navy are concerned.... the leniency
manifested toward the large corporate contractor is often lacking
in respect to the small contractor, who is more readily considered
as expendable by the military services.94
When the contractor delays in performance, the Government
can be greatly harmed unless it adopts an affirmative policy to re-
coup its losses. Beyond the irreparable loss in time, the Government
can suffer substantial loss in dollars-not only for specific items
of additional cost, detailed above,95 but also for the consequential
"impact damages." 96 Where a Government project involves a num-
ber of interdependent contracts adversely affected by one contrac-
tor's delay, the total impact can be devastating.
Yet the Government is left practically without recourse if it
does not even attempt to recover those losses which can be measured
in delay damages. For too often the Government's right to termin-
ate-its only other major alternative-is an empty one:
Some critical procurements are not susceptible to termination action. It
would gain the Government nothing to terminate a sole source procure-
ment. In other cases, it would sorely handicap the Government to ter-
minate a procurement vitally needed where time will not allow repro-
curement action. The Government is practically compelled to accept late
deliveries in these two instances. Fairness dictates that the Government
should be free to accept late deliveries and seek redress in damages,
without having to resort to termination of the contract.97
When one realizes that over half of the Defense Department's nego-
tiated procurements are sole-source, 9 then redress in damages must
93 ScnERER, supra at 307.
94 Id.
95 Supra pp. 17-18.
96 See above discussion of "impact damages," Part III C, supra pp. 18-20.
07 Reda, Cost Contractor's Liability for Damages, 9 AF JAG L. REV. 31, 35
(1967) (emphasis added).
98 Hearings on Economics of Military Procurement Before the Subcomm. on
Economy in Govt. of the Joint Econ. Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 9 (1968).
Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, United States Navy, testified as follows: "Currently,
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be recognized as the only realistic remedy the Government has in
a vast number of cases!
Furthermore, even where termination for default might be in its
best interests, the Government may find it has lost this right. By
allowing the delivery schedule to slip and by condoning late per-
formance, the Government can be said to have elected to permit
the contractor to continue performance, and thus to have waived
its right to default the contractor for failure to complete the work
in accordance with the terms of the contract. The law recognizes
a limited period of time during which the Government can exercise
forbearance, i.e., an interval after passage of the delivery date,
within which the contracting officer can give due consideration to
whether or not the Government should terminate the contract for
default. The right to terminate for default will be deemed to have
been waived, however, when the Government delays for an un-
reasonable period of time before attempting to exercise it.
9 Not-
withstanding waiver of its right to terminate for default, the
Government's claim for damages based on tardy performance sur-
vives."° Indeed, in such circumstances the only real remedy left
to the Government may be the recovery of damages due to con-
tractor delay.
Government procurement regulations contemplate the recovery
of damages in lieu of termination for default,1 1 and that "the con-
tracting officer, on the basis of legal advice, shall take appropriate
action to assert the Government's claim for such damage."'
01 2 In-
deed, as a matter of law, the proper Government official is required
to assert a valid Government claim. 0 3
only about 11 percent of defense procurement is formally advertised-all the rest is
negotiated. . . . In negotiated procurements competition is limited. Over half the De-
fense Department's negotiated procurements are sole source."
These figures are confirmed by the testimony of Mr. Elmer B. Staats, United
States Comptroller General, before the same Committee, on November 11, 1968.
99 See Lumen, Inc., ASBCA No. 6431, 61-2 BCA 3210 (1961); Gubin, Waiver of
the Delivery Schedule in Government Contracts-A Review of the 1967 BCA Decisions,
10 Wm. & MARY L. Rxv. 58 (1968).
100 Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. REv. 1,
423-28 (1957). See also text accompanying notes 6-8 and 21-29, supra.
101 ASPR 8-602.7; NASA PR 8.602-7. NASA PR 8.650-7 states that: "If,
after due consideration, the contracting officer determines that termination is not in
the best interest of the Government although the contractor is in default, the con-
tracting officer may permit the contractor to continue the work, and the contractor
and his sureties shall be liable to the Government for . . . any actual damages occa-
sioned by the failure of the contractor to complete the work in accordance with the
terms of the contract" (emphasis added).
102 NASA PR 8.602-7(b). To the same effect, see ASPR 8-602.7(b).
103 Pacific Hardware Co. v. United States, 49 Ct. Cl. 327, 335 (1914); Bausch
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As a matter of policy, how can a responsible Government afford
not to seek recovery of its losses caused by contractor delay in de-
livery? In numerous cases, especially where the default remedy is
not invoked (for one reason or another), it may be said that there
is no other truly meaningful way to protect the taxpayer's invest-
ment under the contract.
Undoubtedly the Government owes its citizens as taxpayers
the fiduciary duty of care to prevent or recoup loss of their funds:
The entire military establishment has the responsibility to handle
tax funds as a public trust-and drive hard bargains with the manu-
facturers. 04
No one can deny the fact that the American public is entitled to
have its business done economically and prudently. The taxpayer's
investment should be no less protected from loss than that of any
private investor who would expect his corporation to sue for dam-
ages when wronged by another.
Why should a Government contractor be placed, at taxpayer
expense, in a more favored position than a non-Government con-
tractor who in private commercial transactions can rightly expect
to suffer the legal consequences of failure to live up to his bargain
to deliver on time? Indeed, there is no showing that the common
law rule providing for damages is an unjust rule. In the interest
of justice the rule should be applied evenhandedly, and the tax-
payer, as represented by the Government, should be afforded pro-
tection under it.
Much of the argumentation against the Government's enforc-
ing its common law right to delay damages is bottomed, it can be
said, upon a fear of alienating or financially embarrassing the com-
munity of Government contractors. However, one may question
whether the dire consequences predicted would in reality occur in
any but a very small percentage of instances. If the Government
adopted a general policy of asserting its right to delay damages,
the parties would attach more significance to delivery dates. The
contractor would be highly motivated to negotiate a reasonable time
for performance; Government representatives would be pressed to
view delivery dates realistically; and thus the contract would likely
be written according to a reasonable delivery schedule.
& Lomb Optical Co. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 584, 607 (1934); 16 CoMP. GFx.
918, 920 (1937).
104 This statement was made by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., at a hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee probing the $2 billion cost overrun and its conceal-
ment by the Air Force in connection with the C-SA transport contract with Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation. San Francisco Chronicle, May 2, 1969, at 18.
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Although industry might strongly object to an affirmative Gov-
ernment policy to recoup losses caused by contractor delay, one
might hazard the guess that under such a policy industry would
manage to survive, and even perform future Government contracts
in a more timely fashion. Perhaps Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover's
recent testimony before Congress is in point: 105
Industry would very much like to nationalize its losses and privi-
tize its gains . . . They need no assistance from Government officials.
Rather, Government officials should be concerned with protecting the
Government and the people...
You will remember that in 1913, Woodrow Wilson said...
"It is of serious interest to the country that the people at large
should have no lobby and be voiceless in these matters, while great
bodies of astute men seek to create an artificial opinion and to
overcome the interests of the public for their private profit."
The situation today is no different. Congress must remain ever
alert to protect the public from pressure groups that would act counter
to the public interest.10 6
CONCLUSION
Although cursory, the above considerations point up the public
interest in an affirmative Government policy to recover damages
caused by contractor delay. At the same time it appears clear that
such a policy may not be appropriate for certain research and de-
velopment contracts, or certain contracts whose delay in perfor-
mance could result in grossly disproportionate consequential dam-
ages. In such instances the Government might assume the risk of
loss and act as a self-insurer. Thus, with narrow exceptions for
such circumstances, an affirmative policy for recovery should be
adopted in the taxpayer's interest.
Of course one may view the whole matter of Government con-
tracting rather cynically, and conclude that under today's condi-
105 Hearings on Economics of Military Procurement Before the Subcomm. on
Economy in Govt. of the Joint Econ. Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 71 (1968).
100 Id. at 4. Admiral Rickover presented three cardinal points:
First, the laws and regulations concerning defense procurement are tooth-
less, loose, and outmoded. They contain many loopholes that industry is able
to exploit. Defense procurement rules need drastic overhaul and tightening.
Second, in procurement matters, the Department of Defense is too much
influenced by the industry viewpoint. Procurement rules are interpreted to
benefit industry rather than to protect the American public.
Third, Congress will have to take the initiative in correcting deficiencies
in defense procurement. Neither the Department of Defense, the Department
of Commerce, nor the General Accounting Office will do it. It should not be
left to a self-interested defense industry to decide what is the best for the
American people.
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tions of negotiated and sole-source procurement, remedies of the
Government against a large or needed contractor who fails to per-
form as agreed may be largely illusory. The contracting parties may
be seen as allies (not adversaries) in a cooperative endeavor of
self-perpetuation. To suggest that the Government assert an affirma-
tive policy to recover delay damages can be dismissed as a mild
form of heresy. As perceived by the well-known economist, John
Kenneth Galbraith, military procurement is:
.. in the language of labor relations, a sweetheart deal between those
who sell to the Government and those who buy. Once competitive bid-
ding created an adversary relationship between buyer and seller sus-
tained by the fact that, with numerous sellers, any special relationship
with any one must necessarily provoke cries of favoritism. But mod-
em weapons are bought overwhelmingly by negotiation and in most
cases from a single source of supply. (In the fiscal year ending in 1968,
General Accounting Office figures show that 57.9 per cent of the $43
billion in defense contracts awarded in that year was by negotiation
with a single source of supply. Of the remainer 30.6 per cent was
awarded by negotiation where alternative sources of supply had an op-
portunity to participate and only 11.5 per cent was open to advertised
competitive bidding). Under these circumstances the tendency to any
adversary relationship between the Services and their suppliers is min-
imal. Indeed, where there are only one or two sources of supply for a
weapons system, the interest of the Services in sustaining a source of
supply will be no less than that of the firm in question in being sus-
tained. 07
Nevertheless, for the American taxpayer who must pay the bill,
it is of prime importance to seek out "excessive profits, high costs,
poor technical performance, favoritism, delay, and other abuses of
power," as recently noted with respect to military procurement.108
He has a substantial pocketbook interest in proper performance of
Government contracts, and recovery of losses caused by contractor
delay.
The voice of the taxpayer, however, may be but faintly heard
in the wonderland of Government contracting. It seems most often
he merely serves the Government's interest. Perhaps the time has
come for the Government to recognize that it must serve the Amer-
ican taxpayer's interest. "The question is," said Humpty Dumpty,
"which is to be master-that's all."
10T Galbraith, How to Control the Military, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, June, 1969, at
37 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. at 44, 45 (emphasis added).
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